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Abstract The moral enhancement of human beings is a
constant theme in the history of humanity. Today, faced
with the threats of a new, globalised world, concern over
this matter is more pressing. For this reason, the use of
biotechnology to make human beings more moral has
been considered. However, this approach is dangerous
and very controversial. The purpose of this article is to
argue that the use of another new technology, AI, would
be preferable to achieve this goal. Whilst several pro-
posals have been made on how to use AI for moral
enhancement, we present an alternative that we argue to
be superior to other proposals that have been developed.
Keywords Moral enhancement . Artificial intelligence .
Technology ethics . Socratic ethics
Introduction
Human societies have always tried to make their citizens
more moral. Many have also sought to do so on their
own initiative. Methods that have traditionally been
used to improve appropriate behaviour include religion,
propaganda, literature, ethical reflection and education.
However, these traditional methods of moral enhance-
ment are often slow and ineffective. Questionable be-
haviours include lying, corruption, racism, murder, and
paedophilia. These behaviours continue to exist despite
efforts at all levels to prevent them. The ineffectiveness
of such efforts derives, to some extent, from the prob-
lems associated with influencing behavioural patterns
that are influenced greatly by our biology. Many of us
are biologically predisposed to have limited cognition
and to have a limited level of altruism. The influence of
biological conditioning has been corroborated with ex-
periments that show that the degree of altruistic predis-
position is very similar in identical twins and not in
fraternal twins who do not share the same genes [1, 2].
Thanks to the advance of the neurological sciences
and biotechnology, we are now able to influence the
moral deliberation and behaviour of individuals by ei-
ther influencing or intervening directly in their biology.
These interventions include the use of various sub-
stances, such as oxytocin and serotonin, as well as of
various techniques, including transcranial magnetic
stimulation and the provision of neurofeedback.1 The
aim of these interventions would be to promote trust in
others and to foster the desire to collaborate. Some
authors have argued that voluntary implementation of
these interventions would be morally permissible or
morally desirable [4, 5]. Others have argued that such
interventions are urgent and that they should be
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-019-09401-y
1 A brief survey of these and some other interventions is provided in
Savulescu & Maslen [3].
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compulsory if we are to survive as a species. For Persson
& Savulescu this is so because our natural morality is
unable to face the inescapable and serious challenges of
a society that is radically different from the society that
evolutionarily shaped our morality [6].2
However, these biological interventions have been
criticised for their possible adverse effects on health, for
their threats to autonomy and personal identity, for being
morally counterproductive by favouring, at least if they
are optional, the immoral behaviour of the free-rider, and
for their potential to foster exclusive empathy [8]. In
addition, these proposals for moral bio-enhancement are
very simplistic. Morality is not only about motivation. It
does not consist exclusively in trusting others and being
willing to collaborate. As trusting those who are untrust-
worthy and cooperating with those who wish to take
advantage may not be good, for example, morality also
requires interpreting situations, deliberating properly and,
above all, having reasons to act.
Therefore, it is worth considering other forms of moral
enhancement offered by this new technologically ad-
vanced world. In this article, we will consider one that
has not yet been studied much, given the scarce bibliog-
raphy about it, one that we will call ‘moral artificial
intelligence enhancement (henceforth: AIenhancement)’.
Our goal is to present a new proposal on how artificial
intelligence could make individuals more moral, more
rapidly and successfully than traditionalmethods, andwith
fewer risks and controversies than bio-enhancement. Risks
and controversies would be decreased as AIenhancement
does not aim to alter the biological causes of our motiva-
tions, but merely to improve our moral capacities without
the use of biotechnological interventions.
In order to do so, we will: firstly, characterise our new
proposal by differentiating it from other proposals of
moral enhancement through AI; secondly, show its fea-
sibility by specifying some guidelines for future soft-
ware that could be derived from it; and finally, try to
answer the objection that this enhancement will be
unsuccessful because it does not affect our motivations.
Exhaustive Enhancement
In this context, ‘artificial intelligence’ means ‘ubiqui-
tous computing’ or ‘ambient intelligence’; that is, a
system that collects information from multiple sensors
and databases to process it according to its functional
relevance for the system user. Artificial intelligence has
already improved the quality of life of many human
beings, even if it may not have improved their moral
behaviour. However, it could also serve to make our
lives more moral.
A first way to use AI to enhance morality derives
from what we now know as ‘machine ethics’. Machine
ethics is not intrinsically about human moral enhance-
ment. It aims to turn machines into moral decision-
makers.3 Dietrich is so pessimistic about the moral
nature of humans and so optimistic about the possibili-
ties of AI that he adopts an obligation to Busher in our
extinction^ to create a better world in which only ethical
robots inhabit the Earth (p. 531) [7]. These robots would
have achieved that BCopernican turn^, inaccessible to
most humans by their biological conditioning, which
allows them to act from the belief that each of them is
not the centre of the universe (pp. 532–3) [7]. Really, he
concludes, these machines would be nothing more than
improved versions of Homo sapiens; he calls them
BHomo sapiens 2.0^ because they would be Bthe better
angels of our nature^, without the defects of those who
are less angelic (p. 536) [7].4
Whilst Dietrich’s proposal has not been greeted with
great enthusiasm, some authors suggest that moral ma-
chines might be created to improve the morality of
human decisions, rather than to make human beings
redundant. Human decisions could be overridden or
corrected by machines that would be better at moral
2 In a similar vein, Dietrich maintains that, due to evolutionary condi-
tions of adaptation, we are Bgenetically hardwired^ not to be very
moral. We can progress morally, he says, but there are immoral behav-
iours (conceived as behaviours that are harmful to others) from which,
to a greater or lesser degree, we will not be able to free ourselves, given
their usefulness in our evolutionary past. Such behaviours include
Blying, cheating, stealing, raping, murdering, assaulting, mugging,
abusing children, as well as such things as ruining the careers of
competitors, negatively discriminating on the basis of sex, race, reli-
gion, sexual preference, and national origin and so forth^ (p. 534) [7].
3 This aim is philosophically controversial. For example, Searle be-
lieves that making moral decisions is something that can be done only
by human beings [9]. Whitby criticises it [10].
4 If someone holds that we have an obligation to extinguish ourselves
to give way for machines that are better than us morally, it makes sense
to ask oneself what the point of such an alternative world would be.
Dietrich believes that this world would be given meaning by the
machines themselves because they would be conscious and empathet-
ic. He admits that we still have a lot to know about what consciousness
is, but he believes that building machines with human-like intelligence
will imply that these machines are conscious, as we ourselves are
conscious. If we are able to build such a machine, he thinks that it
could be programmed to make what he calls the BCopernican turn^: the
realisation that oneself matters and that, since others are like oneself,
others matter as well. Dietrich claims that the machine’s capacity to
make this turn would depend partly on its capacity to have sympathy
for others (p. 537) [7].
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reasoning as their decisions would be characterised by a
constant impartiality, consistency, and absence of emo-
tional influences [11]. They would be free from limita-
tions, including the irrational egocentric or group
favouritism that very often leads to immoral behaviour.
In addition, the machine would not get tired of the
constant determination of what is right.
This way of enhancing humans, which leaves their
moral decision-making entirely to machines, will be
called ‘exhaustive enhancement’. In this approach, to
do the right thing, we just have to obey the machine.
This proposal tries to enhance moral behaviour by cre-
ating autonomous artificial agents that would have mor-
al capabilities superior to those of humans. It would be
based on a conception of morality that the system de-
signer considers to be valid and with which they con-
figure the system to direct human beliefs, motives, and
actions.5 The essential aspect of this proposal is that all
human participants, including the designer, would be
expected to take a passive role after the original pro-
gramming had been completed. We would not need to
expend any psychological and/or behavioural efforts to
achieve the desired enhancement apart from deciding to
allow the system to make decisions for us (pp. 140–1)
[13]. Human beings could then execute these decisions
either by the machine controlling our behaviour directly
(the direct model), for example through a brain implant
that directs our actions, or indirectly through a machine
or a political system sanctioning any behaviour that
deviates from that which is demanded by the system
(the indirect model). Whereas deviation would still be
possible in the indirect model, it would be strongly
discouraged. We would simply need to do as we are
told.
Reasons against the Exhaustive Project
We distinguish five problems with the exhaustive pro-
ject. The first is that it may be hard to set this up as the
existence of pluralism may thwart the idea of finding a
consensus on which theory should inform the system.
The second is that, even if such a consensus could be
achieved, wemay still fail to set up a good system due to
human or nonhuman limitations. The third is that we
doubt whether the system can be an autonomous moral
agent, which is why it would not be able to make moral
decisions. The fourth is that the possibility of making
moral progress is excluded. The final problem is that it
would mean the death of morality. We will discuss each
of these problems in turn.
The first drawback of the exhaustive project is that
we do not have a consensus on which ethical scheme
should inform the design of the system. Should we use
deontology, utilitarianism, contractualism, virtue ethics,
or some other ethical theory?6 Regardless of which
theory is chosen, it is probable that there would always
be people who disagree with the system, where the
choice of one theory would lead the system to direct
different actions than those that would be promoted on
the basis of another theory. One might argue that this
need not be a problem as multiple system designers
could develop multiple systems, for example deontolog-
ical and utilitarian systems. Users of such systems could
then simply decide which system to use. This, however,
does not resolve the problem of value pluralism. It
makes it worse. By surrendering our moral decision-
making to machines, we would forgo the possibility of
ever reaching any agreement where different systems
provide different solutions to a moral issue.
A potential way in which one could try to address this
problem is to ensure that the system is not programmed
to make decisions on the basis of some abstract moral
theory, but that it is programmed to decide on the basis
of actual decisions that people have made. This is what a
group of researchers of a ‘moral machine’ project at
MIT intend: that the system, in this case that of a
driverless car, would make moral decisions by virtue
of generalizations from what people actually judge on
what must be done in dilemmatic moral situations [16].
To find out what people think in moral situations that
might be relevant for the development of autonomous
vehicles, the research team questioned over two million
people from more than two hundred countries. It found
that moral judgments vary significantly between people
from different cultural traditions. Whilst the authors
claim that their findings imply that the Bjourney to
consensual machine ethics is not doomed from the
start^, we agree with them that they present a significant
challenge towards Bdeveloping global, socially
5 This is what Savulescu & Maslen call Bstrong moral artificial
intelligence^ (p. 84) [6], and what Schaefer calls Bdirect moral
enhancement^ (p. 262) [12].
6 Although contractualism is usually known as a political theory, there
are authors such as Gauthier [14] and Scanlon [15], who have devel-
oped ethical theories from the idea of the hypothetical contract.
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acceptable principles for machine ethics^ (pp. 63, 59)
[16].7 They present a particularly difficult challenge for
the exhaustive project as it is unclear why people should
simply follow the moral decisions that are made by a
system that may be perceived to make questionable
decisions. Indeed, there is a significant concern that
those who would design and implement an exhaustive
system might foster their own ends, which may be
biased by their own interests.
The second problem is human or nonhuman fallibil-
ity. System designers might make programming errors
that result in them, as well as others, being directed to
commit particular actions that do not flow from their
values. Supporters of the exhaustive project might coun-
ter that this may be extremely unlikely. Even if this is
granted, some errors might still occur due to problems
that are caused by environmental factors that are outside
human control, for example Ba short circuit modifying
some component of the system^ (p. 392) [17]. Sup-
porters of the exhaustive project might retort that this
need not be a problem because the system would be an
autonomous moral agent with superior moral capacities.
It would therefore be able to correct any errors that were
made either by their designers or that would result from
any physical limitations.
This takes us to the third problem. We do not think
that there is any system that can be regarded as an
autonomous moral agent. Therefore, simply doing as
we are told would not be advisable. Defenders of the
exhaustive proposal might retort that the system could
become autonomous, even if it might not be autono-
mous at the time that it is being designed. Like human
children, who are not autonomousmoral agents from the
moment that they are born, they might argue that the
system could also become an autonomous moral agent
at some stage in its development. What this analogy
ignores, however, is that children become able to reject
particular assumptions as they grow older, whilst com-
puters are never capable of doing so. Children owe this
capacity to the fact that they are never machines in the
first place.We do not mean to say that computers cannot
be designed in such a way that they start running on
different algorithms from those that they used at the
outset, but that they can only do so if they are designed
in that way. Many children, by contrast, will start to
develop their own ethical views without ever having
been programmed to do so, and frequently in spite of
their parents’ moral views. The sheer fact that some
computers may be able to run on different algorithms
from those that they used at the outset, however, does
not imply that they are or could be moral agents.
To illustrate why we think that a computer is unable
to make moral decisions, let us consider these two
imaginary cases. The first case is the case of Geoff,
who was brought up in a family where every Friday
night they ate mussels. Geoff learned to like eating
mussels and he developed an ethical theory that it was
fine to eat mussels. He now finds himself on an island
without a chip shop where they sell cooked mussels.
However, he finds mussels on the beach and rejoices in
cooking them so that he can eat them. The second case is
identical to the first, with the exception that Geoff finds
animals on the beach who look like mussels, but are not
in fact mussels. In fact, the species has never been seen
by any human being before. Geoff decides, however, to
treat them in a similar manner.
A computer might simulate human reasoning as fol-
lows in the first case: Geoff approves of other people
killing mussels in order to eat them. This is deduced
from the principle that people are allowed to kill mussels
in order to eat them. Since Geoff is also a human being,
the principle of consistency demands that, if Geoff
approves of other people killing mussels in order to eat
them, he must also approve of doing so himself. We
think that the computer will only be able to come to this
decision if it has been programmed to base its moral
advice on the principle of consistency. It seems implau-
sible to us to think that the computer would be able to
make the autonomous decision to value the principle of
consistency. For this to be possible, the computer would
need to grasp the moral importance of consistency.
In order to be able to do so, the system would need to
possess not only the capacity of imitating analytic
(logical) judgments, but also the capacity of making
synthetic judgments.8 A synthetic judgment that under-
lies the first case is the judgment that it is good to be
consistent. The reason this is a synthetic judgment is that
someone who rejects that it is good to be consistent does
not make a logical error. The meaning of the word good
7 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this
study and this point to our attention.
8 The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is
commonly made in philosophy, for example by Kant, who
wrote that analytic judgments are true by definition as the
predicate is contained within the subject (e.g.: BAll bodies are
extended.^), whereas this is not the case in synthetic judgments
(e.g.: BAll bodies are heavy.^) (p. A6–7) [18].
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does not imply ‘to be consistent’, or vice versa. Whilst
supporters of the exhaustive project might defend their
project in light of this challenge by pointing out that
logical conclusions that follow from well-chosen values
should provide good moral advice, the second case
highlights the problems associated with the exhaustive
project. It presents a genuinely new situation. Whereas
Geoff may rely on certain parameters to determine
whether or not he would be justified in killing these
animals, for example their degree of similarity to mus-
sels or some behavioural traits, it would be wrong for
Geoff to fix these parameters in advance. Doing so
would imply that Geoff blinds himself to new facts that
may arise in his encounters which would alter the pa-
rameters that he had hitherto considered to be signifi-
cant, for example the realisation that these animals com-
municated with him in a way that he had never experi-
enced with any other animals. It is unclear to us how
computers, by contrast, might become sensitive to any
morally relevant facts. They can only mimic synthetic
judgments by relying on parameters that are Bspecified
ahead of time^ (p. 19) [19].
This point must not be misunderstood. We do not
claim that a computer would not be able to identify some
facts as morally salient even if they were not identified
as such at the time of its design. To use an example
provided by Penrose, some computers may, for exam-
ple, be capable of identifying a face as a human face,
even if they had never observed that particular face
before, and bestow the same moral significance on that
face as on other human faces (p. 18) [19]. We do claim,
however, that computers lack the emotional sensitivity
that is required to make moral judgments. As computers
lack the emotional sensitivity to understand that animals
who look like mussels may, in fact, be profoundly
different from mussels, they would be expected to ad-
vise us to treat these animals as if they were mussels.
One might argue that this is not a problem, as this is
precisely what Geoff decides to do. This, however,
misses the point. We have argued already that Geoff
should not blind himself to any morally salient facts that
may present themselves to him in his encounters. Imag-
ine that the animals in question told Geoff ‘cook me’
upon the point of being put into boiling water. Geoff
might be so touched by this that it might lead him to alter
his intention. This kind of sensitivity is required for
Geoff to operate as a moral being. When we compare
this with a computer’s ‘sensitivity’, we are unaware of
the existence of any computer that shows any greater
sensitivity towards the moral interests of human beings
than, say, a deckchair, and it is unclear to us how an
aggregate of molecules that has been assembled by
human beings could ever possess such sensitivity.
To sum up this third concern, we grant that some
computers may be able to simulate or mimic analytic
judgments reliably and synthetic judgments less reliably
(as the latter defeat logic), but we defend the view that
morality depends on the ability to make synthetic judg-
ments, for example the judgment that the logical con-
clusions of an axiological egotist should (not) be follow-
ed. We are not aware that an assemblage of molecules
that has been put together by a human being has ever
been able to make such a judgment, and we doubt
whether it is even possible, as we consider emotional
sensitivity to be a necessary condition for making such
judgments.9
The fourth problemwith the exhaustive project is that
it stifles the possibility of moral progress. Moral judg-
ments that are made today may no longer be acceptable
at some other time. If we allow the system to decide, we
would be left with a static account of morality as it
would only be able to simulate, rather than to make
judgments. In the nineteenth century, certain values
were widespread that are no longer considered to be
appropriate today, for example particular views about
slavery or about the role of women. Similarly, it is likely
that some views which are held dearly today will, one
day, be looked upon as morally problematic. If we allow
human decisions to be determined by the system, how-
ever, we would essentially forgo the possibility of moral
change. To allow the possibility of moral progress, there
must be moral pluralism and, consequently, dissent. Just
as Mill argued about conventional morality, the morality
established by the machine can never be challenged if
there are no other proposals [22]. For this to occur it is
necessary to question the values that determine the
operation of the machine.
The fifth problemwith the exhaustive project is that it
would result in a loss of the sense of morality. Episte-
mologically, there are two possibilities: either human
beings lack the capacity to know what is right and
wrong, or at least some human beings do have the
capacity to know what is right and wrong. If we accept
9 Whilst our view that no computerised system can be a moral agent is
contested (see e.g. [20]), it is not without support in the literature. See
for exampleMiller, who writes: BWhile robots are sensitive to physical
properties, e.g. heat and light, they are not sensitive to moral properties.
Accordingly, robots are not moral agents^ (p. 162) [21].
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the former view and accept, against our earlier conten-
tion, that machines are capable of knowing which be-
haviours are ethical, human beings would simply have
to defer to machines. This deference would not be based
on sound judgment, but on blind faith, questioning why
we should adopt such faith. Onemight argue that blindly
accepting the advice of a system undermines the very
nature of morality, which depends on individuals devel-
oping their moral positions on the basis of moral rea-
soning, rather than on the basis of blind faith.
If we accept the second possibility, however, the
possibility arises that we might nevertheless undermine
our ethical capacity by following the system. The reason
for this is that we would be ‘outsourcing’ moral deci-
sion-making. The adoption of such a passive role might
ultimately make us less confident in making ethical
decisions, which Vallor argues to result in moral de-
skilling [23]. It would imply that being good at moral
reasoning is not valued much. This is rightly questioned
by van Wynsberghe and Robbins, who argue that, by
leaving this function to machines, we deprive ourselves
of what Aristotle recognised as an essential element of
the good life: leading a life dominated by moral under-
standing, developed through practice [24].10
This shows that, even if the position that machines
can be better at moral reasoning is adopted, this should
not necessarily be a reason to rely on them. The direct
model would entail the death of morality itself, as moral
decisions would no longer be made by human beings,
but by the system. Because the systemwould govern the
behaviour of human beings, human beings would make
‘their’ decisions without practically participating in
them. People would surrender their moral autonomy,
rather than enhance it. A similar problem besets the
indirect model. Even if we would still be able to choose
against the system, the fact that any deviant behaviour
would be classed as immoral would provide a strong
incentive to avoid the behaviour in question. The prob-
ability that deviant behaviour would be tolerated might,
in fact, be slim. This would be a particular concern for
those who disagree with our contention that machines
cannot be autonomous as suchmachines might decide to
rule the roost. The concern would not be absent for those
who agree with us, however, as sophisticated machines
that are good at mimicking human decision-making
might be perceived to be autonomous and to be capable
of making superior moral decisions. In both cases, ma-
chines might dominate us to such an extent as to severe-
ly compromise human liberty and life.
We maintain that the point is not to enhance moral
conduct exclusively, but rather to enhance moral con-
duct because it reflects a better agent. Therefore, the
deciding agent should, ultimately, always be indepen-
dent of the machine. No enhancement is possible if it
prevents conscious reasoning and rational deliberation,
which the exhaustive proposal would prevent. There-
fore, the main objective ofmoral AIenhancement should
not be to change our behaviour, but the ways in which
we make moral decisions. Rather than design an artifi-
cial mind that would regulate our behaviour, the aim
should be to use the different functions of ambient
intelligence (collecting, computing, and updating data)
to help us to reach better decisions ourselves and, con-
sequently, to act better.
Auxiliary Enhancement
We will now set out a new proposal that, in contrast to
the exhaustive project, requires the agent’s participation.
We will call it ‘auxiliary enhancement’. The agent has a
less passive role here because he gives personal criteria
to the machine that enable it to process information. The
agent then prompts the machine to provide advice,
which the agent considers before deciding. The agent
does not lose their autonomy at any stage. The values
with which the machine works are those of the agent.
The agent’s values are a fixed benchmark with which a
system is built that helps the agent to decide from that
framework of values.
This is what is intended by Savulescu & Maslen and
by Giubilini & Savulescu [3, 25]. In the former article,
the authors envisage that the agent chooses from a broad
list of values that are provided by the system and ranks
their relative importance, and that the system then rec-
ommends a moral decision that accords with this value
hierarchy. In the latter article, the authors suggest that
different versions of the system should be available, and
that the agent should choose which version they wish to
adopt, based on their value system. The design of this
system is inspired by Firth’s idea of morality, where a
moral system is conceived as a collection of statements
to which an ideal observer would react in a particular
10 Schaefer makes a similar point, arguing that Mill would have
opposed the exhaustive enhancement project on the basis of the
view that it would deprive the individual of the values of
autonomous reasoning and personal responsibility for the ef-
fects of one’s actions [12].
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way. The observer would be ideal in that they would be
omniscient about non-ethical facts, omnipercipient (i.e.
capable of visualizing, imagining and using all the in-
formation simultaneously), disinterested, dispassionate,
and consistent, but normal (or like an average person) in
all other respects (p. 321) [26]. The system envisaged by
Giubilini and Savulescu (p. 7) [25] would differ from
Firth’s ideal observer as its moral advice would not be
based on the perspective of some Babsolute observer^
(in the sense that Firth (p. 319) [26] gave to this term, to
refer to an observer who formulates ethical judgments
without containing egocentric expressions like BI like^
or BI believe^), but reflect the ethical values of the
particular human agent using it, within certain con-
straints. Giubilini and Savulescu illustrate that these
constraints could, for example, be set by Catholic moral
experts. Those who want to be good Catholics, but do
not know exactly what principles to apply in particular
circumstances could, in this way, choose to use an
artificial moral advisor designed by Catholic experts,
rather than some other version of the system. In this
way, the authors believe that moral agents could ensure
that their views accord with the Catholic ethos, thus
establishing narrow reflective equilibrium, as well as
balance the Catholic perspective against others, thus
establishing wide reflective equilibrium.11
We think that these approaches have two problems.
Firstly, the role of the agent continues to be too passive.
Once the agent has chosen which values they wish to
adopt, the agent’s only remaining decision is to decide
whether or not to accept the result of the machine’s
deliberation. As the agent does not need to understand
the rational connections between their values and the
decisions that are made by the system, their moral skills
may not be enhanced a great deal. If the machine
stopped working, the agent’s decisions might not be
much better than what they were in the beginning either,
as the focus is on helping the agent to make the right
decisions, rather than on helping the agent to become a
better moral agent.
A second problem with both approaches is that, once
the values had been fixed by the moral agent, either
through choosing a value hierarchy (in the former ap-
proach) or through choosing a value framework (in the
latter approach), the system would merely recommend
decisions that accord with those values, rather than
encourage the user to question those values. The agent
may, at any time, rank the values provided by the system
differently or choose to use a different version of the
system, but we are concerned that they might be unlike-
ly to do so. This is recognised by Savulescu andMaslen,
who write that using the machine might encourage
deference, rather than Bdeeper reflection^ (p. 92) [3]. If
it is true that people are frequently reluctant to change
their moral values, they may be expected to be even
more so if they think that their decision was based on the
advice from a reliable machine.Whilst these approaches
allow for a plurality of different perspectives, it is hard to
see how they might foster wide reflective equilibrium or
agreement between those who choose different
(versions of) systems.
Socratic Enhancement
The approach that we envisage, by contrast, involves a
constant interaction between system and agent. There
should be no previous lists or systems of values from
which to improve the morality of the agent. Through the
constant interaction between the agent and the system,
the possibility that the agent’s values would be changed
through their dialogue with the machine is increased.
The crucial point is that the system should work to help
us to reach a better decision ourselves, without commit-
ting us to any pre-designed ethical perspectives. Our
decision would be determined through interacting with
a system that had not been configured with previous
designer or agent values.12
This approach therefore resembles something like
Socratic help. Obviously, it would not be Socratic in
the sense that the dialectical method envisaged by Plato
simply recollects certain ideas that everyone has hidden
within their nature because of their previous reincarna-
tions. Nor would it be in the sense of seeking a definition
of a concept, usually of some virtue. Our proposal is
inspired by the role of the deliberative exchange in
Socratic philosophy as an aid to develop better moral
judgments. Socrates always presents himself and acts as
a mere assistant who aims to refute the definitions he
11 For the notion of reflective equilibrium, see for example Rawls [27].
12 Seville & Field outline what could be an Ethical Decision Assistant
that could be made available to everyone on the web [28]. The aim of
this assistant would not be to give agents answers about what they
should do, but to allow them to reconsider their personal values in the
light of consequentialist considerations and consistency. Although they
also grant an auxiliary role to AI, there is no room for the kind of
machine-agent interaction that we defend here.
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receives from his interlocutors. He, as Plato once points
out, is like a midwife who only helps the other to give
birth to his own knowledge. In our case, this knowledge
would not reveal any hidden or common-sense truth, but
consist in a moral judgment that was formed by apply-
ing conditions of empirical, logical and ethical rigour to
one’s beliefs. The agent should always have a privileged
place, should always provide the first solution in a
significant conflict, which is then submitted to staged
scrutiny so that the machine, like Socrates, may ask
relevant questions and reveal potential failures in the
argumentation.
It does not seem to be appropriate to object to this
proposal, as with other proposals at biological or AI
moral enhancement, that it would threaten the autonomy
of the enhanced agent. Rather, the intervention would
increase autonomy, avoiding those (especially cogni-
tive) limitations that prevent the agent from doing the
right thing. By gathering, computerizing and updating
data, the AI would enable the agent to be better prepared
to make moral decisions, allowing them to find the
ethical response to every dilemma for themselves.
Our proposal, therefore, has two features that differ-
entiate it significantly from other auxiliary approaches,
such as those of Savulescu & Maslen and Giubilini &
Savulescu [3, 25]. The first feature has to do with the
degree of participation of the agent. In those approaches,
the machine deliberates for the agent; in our proposal,
the degree of participation is greater as the agent delib-
erates in dialogue with the machine. The second feature
that qualitatively differentiates our proposal from those
is that the emphasis is placed on the formative role of the
machine for the agent, rather than on the result. The aim
is to help the agent to learn to reason ethically, rather
than to help the agent to learn which actions the system
deems to be compatible with particular values.
To avoid the risk of this enhancement turning into an
‘exhaustive’ form, the system should be programmed to
be no more than an auxiliary aid for each agent, who
always has the first and the final word in the process.
Algorithms would be needed to avoid themachine being
biased towards particular values and ethical theories.
This approach therefore contrasts with the current ten-
dency to develop prototypical computational models
based on particular value theories, such as Bentham’s
utilitarian theory in the JEREMY program [29]; a mix-
ture of Ross’s prima facie duty theory and Rawls’s
reflexive equilibrium in a prototype called W.D. [29],
which was then applied to the field of medical ethics
under the name MeEthEx [30]; a casuistic scheme that
compares concrete dilemmas, such as the Truth-Teller;
or the so-called SIROCCO program that has been
applied to the field of engineering [31].
Instead, we pick up on the intention of early pro-
grams to help users rather than to give them a solution.
These early programs had, above all, a pedagogical aim
and, in the beginning, their specific aim was to help
students to reason ethically through the presentation of
practical problems. They started with videos about these
problems and tried to invite the students to ethical
exploration.
For example, the Ethos program, designed byDonald
Searing to accompany an engineering ethics manual,
provided videos and interviews on certain dilemmas to
provoke students to ask new questions and to rethink
their previous positions. In order to do so, it encouraged
the user to make step-by-step decisions that would be
recorded and then examined according to a basic
scheme proposed by the program to take apart moral
decisions: firstly, to delimit the problem; secondly, to
outline alternatives; and finally, to evaluate each one
(p. 30) [31].
Another example is an ‘ethical decision-making as-
sistant’ app, created by theMarkkula Center for Applied
Ethics at Santa Clara University, to guide ethical deci-
sion-making. The app can be accessed via the internet or
downloaded to a mobile device or computer with iTunes
[32]. The user of the app must determine the degree to
which certain conduct would affect possible stake-
holders by considering specific ethical criteria: utility,
rights, justice, common good and virtue. At the same
time, the user is allowed to inform himself, thanks to
certain inputs about these ethical criteria that accompany
each stage of decision-making. Later, the user has to
hierarchize these criteria by virtue of the relevance that
he gives to them for the case in question. Finally, the
app, by virtue of a score obtained from the answers
given by the user, advises the user whether or not to
modify the option considered.
A third example is the Dax Cowart program, a mul-
timedia, interactive program designed to explore the
ethical dimensions of the real case of Dax Cowart, a
victim of an accident that resulted in serious and very
painful wounds and burns. Cowart insisted on his right
to stop the treatment that had been imposed on him. The
key question was whether his wish should be fulfilled.
The program featured videos and interviews with Dax
Cowart and his doctor, lawyer, mother and healthcare
F. Lara, J. Deckers282
staff, allowing the user to see the problem from different
perspectives. The program periodically asked the user to
decide whether Dax’s request to let him die should be
accepted. It then presented alternative information and
perspectives that could prompt users to reconsider
(p. 30) [31].
A fourth example is the work by Robbins, Wallace
and Puka, who initially devised a system that used web
pages containing links to relevant ethical principles and
theories, as well as a simple ‘coach’ in ethics [33]. Later
on, these authors designed a much more sophisticated
computational model that combined collaborative prob-
lem solving (i.e., several human subjects discussing an
ethical problem), the psychological theory of planned
behaviour, and the agency model of belief-wish-
intention into a decision aid. It aimed to simulate differ-
ent roles, including that of counsellor, group facilitator,
interaction coach, and forecaster of how human subjects
discuss and attempt to solve ethical dilemmas [34].
Whilst in line with these early examples of
AIenhancement that focus on a constant interaction
between machine and human being, we will, in the
following section, outline a more ambitious system to
aid ethical decision-making that might be developed
thanks to advances in AI.
Criteria and Implementation of Socratic
Enhancement
Taking into account the above, we would now like to
propose a series of functions that should be taken into
account when computer programs are designed with the
aim to help moral agents to make moral judgments and
to facilitate their behaviour according to such judgments.
Providing Empirical Support Although moral judg-
ments are not fully verifiable by facts, they can be
refuted when they are based on empirically refuted
premises. Thanks to its access to and rapid handling of
big data, an AI system has a privileged position to
suggest that, sometimes, the agent’s judgments may
have no empirical basis and to require the agent in that
case to modify their judgments to make them more
truthful.
Improving Conceptual Clarity Moral judgments fre-
quently use concepts that are not clearly defined and
that can condition the validity of the judgment or the
interpretation that can be made of it. The agent is not
always aware of this plurality of meanings. The AI
system can warn them of this and, therefore, to remind
them of the requirement to be rigorous in determining
the meaning of any concepts that are used. The system
can acquire this knowledge both from the big-data
(crossed information coming from many dictionaries,
grammar textbooks, records of use of language) and
from the conclusions of experts in ethics that are taken
into account when configuring the software. The use of
experts is especially important because many essential
concepts in ethical debates (death, guilt, person, ...) have
strong normative elements that have multiple interpre-
tations and whose knowledge is essential in the precise
defence of moral positions.
Understanding Argumentative Logic Many people may
agree with the view that moral judgments should be
based on arguments that have to follow certain logical
guidelines. For each type of argument (by generalisa-
tion, deduction, analogy, ...) there are some logical rules
that the agent may not have followed either due to
ignorance or due to the excessive weight given, more
or less consciously, to irrelevant factors such as
preconceived and biased interests or beliefs. It would
therefore be of great value for moral enhancement if the
computer system were designed to make the agent see
the logical deficiencies of his argument. This could
be done by showing them, by the formalisation of
their argument, the error committed, or by using
the most common repertoire of fallacies in the
hope that it may make them understand why their
reasoning is invalid. In addition, it would be very
useful for the system to warn the agent of the
need for their particular moral judgments to be
ethically coherent in the light of an ultimate value
criterion that gives meaning to all the agent’s
judgments. Agents who agree that consistency is
important will agree, for example, that it is not
valid to justify an action by virtue of the belief
that it is derived from the ultimate criterion that it
serves the happiness of all, and to demand, at the
same time, an action that is justified by the prin-
ciple of respect to the other, regardless of its
consequences for the happiness of all those affected. In
such a case, the system should prompt the agent to
provide a meta-criterion that gives coherence to his
judgments, which does not leave the justification of
her judgments to irreconcilable reasons.
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Testing whether one’s Judgment May Possess Ethical
Plausibility The moral agent may not only be enhanced
by knowing the logic of his arguments, but also by their
knowledge of the debates in normative ethics. To do
this, software should be enriched through the accumu-
lation of information that is based on the main theoret-
ical positions on any particular issue. But we should not
forget that pure logic and theoretical debate in strictly
rational terms can lead to foolish and very implausible
conclusions. Therefore, although the system should not
be biased towards the common sense or the legal view, it
could be programmed to make the agent aware of this
view so that they may be prompted to think more
carefully where they deviate significantly from it.
Raising Awareness of Personal Limitations AI could
also be of great help alerting the agent to certain biolog-
ical and environmental factors that could affect deci-
sion-making. Through monitoring the physiology, the
mental states, and the environment of the agent, the
system could warn of certain risks of deliberating badly.
Examples of such negative influences on moral deliber-
ation are: shortness of sleep, the time elapsed since the
last meal, exhaustion, inappropriate levels of particular
hormones and neurotransmitters, the presence of partic-
ular foodstuffs or psychoactive drugs that are known to
have a detrimental role, and environmental factors such
as heat and noise (pp. 85–6) [3].
Advising on how to Execute one’s Decision The system
could be of great help in advising the agent how to put
into practice the moral decisions that they have reached.
Some very advanced technologies have already been
applied to areas of cognitive decision-making. These
are software programs that quickly access a large space
of digitised information and that, once certain search
criteria have been added, assist human beings in areas
where complicated decisions must be made [35–37].
The areas where most progress has been made in this
respect are business and medicine.13 In the latter area the
use of AI has resulted in a technology called the clinical
decision-support system, which is an information tech-
nology that has been developed to improve clinical
decision-making. It is being used to assist doctors in
formulating diagnoses and making medical decisions.
The software receives information about the patient’s
symptoms and condition, and crosses it with medical
databases and the medical history of the patient and his/
her family, to conclude a diagnosis and the correspond-
ing treatment [39–41]. This software could be a refer-
ence to help the moral agent to decide on how to apply
moral judgments that he has previously adopted as
valid. The software would receive information about
the moral decision that has been adopted and would
use it to process relevant information about how it might
affect others and the environment, advising us how our
behaviour would best fit our moral position.
To sum up, the system would receive, through com-
puters, virtual reality devices or brain interfaces, infor-
mation from many databases on science, linguistics,
logic, and on how people think and reason morally.
Moreover, it would collect information from experts in
argumentation theory and ethical theory. With the help
of sensors, it would also monitor the actual biology and
the environment of the agent. The system would then
process all this information and, using the aforemen-
tioned criteria, engage in a conversation with the agent
through a virtual voice assistant. In this conversation,
the systemwould ask a number of questions. These may
include the following:Why? And why? What makes you
think that? Is this your last reason? Why do you think
this is the best reason? What about this other reason?
What do you mean with this word? Do you know there
are other meanings? Are you aware that your assertion
has no scientific basis? Are you aware that both asser-
tions are contradictory? Are you aware that this deduc-
tion/induction/analogy… is not valid? Do you know that
this is not a common value? Are you aware that your
current physical condition/environment is not the best
one to make an important decision? Do you know that,
in these circumstances, your decision could be best
executed like this?
What about Motivation?
We believe that, with the proposed Socratic enhance-
ment that we have sketched, human beings could over-
come some of their limitations to behave morally. How-
ever, we are also aware of the proposal’s limitations. The
AI system will not suddenly turn us into good moral
agents. This is because it cannot correct the motivational
factors that prevent us from acting morally. Due to the
characteristics of this type of technology (as opposed to
13 Examples of recent software and platforms developed to improve
the analytical and decision-making processes of companies are HANA
(by SAP), DOMO, Apptus and Avanade [38].
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biomedical technologies) and to the auxiliary character
of our proposal, AI may, in the first instance, only
remedy our cognitive limitations. Thanks to this tech-
nology, the agent could acquire more precise, rigorous
and consistent judgments about what is correct. But
what good is this if the agent, because of strong emo-
tions or a weak will, does not feel motivated by those
judgments?14
This is a fair question, but the possibility that the
cognitive help of AI may indirectly modify the motiva-
tions and emotional dispositions of the moral agent
cannot be ruled out. Thanks to their ability to make
better judgments, people could be sensitised to rethink
some emotive positions that they may have. We refer
here to the persuasive power of good arguments, the
persuasion of reason, which many philosophers, from
ancient Greece to modern times, have accentuated. Peo-
ple can change their values after thinking about them.
Artificial intelligence can be an excellent tool for this.
The system can make us accept new values by showing
us the rational force of the arguments that support them
and that we would not have seen without the help of the
system. By incorporating virtual reality, the system can
also persuade us to take the consequences of our actions
more seriously. It may allow us to ‘experience’ the
realities of (particularly) distant others more vividly,
and to imagine much better how our actions and omis-
sions might affect them. Even though these features are
cognitive, it is likely that they would reduce the problem
caused by weakness of the will (pp. 502–4) [28].
We think that the AI system would fulfil this persua-
sive role to a greater extent than human dialogists.Why?
There are studies that show that our trust in machines in
general, and in computers and robotic systems in partic-
ular, depends on their effectiveness rate, that is, on the
statistics of their past performance and their capacity to
respond appropriately to new situations [44]. Effective-
ness also matters when we decide whether to trust other
human beings who help us in our decision-making.
However, as long as people remain clear of the fact that
the AI system is imbued with values that cannot be
better than those possessed by human beings, their faith
in human assistants is likely to be lower as human
psychology makes us wary of various logical and voli-
tional limitations that are absent in the AI system.15
Moreover, trust in AI systems could be increased if
they were regularly redesigned to improve their cogni-
tive and affective appeal [47]. With regard to the former,
human beings might increase their trust in them, for
example if systems provide up-to-date statistics of their
past successful performance, or if the algorithms be-
come simpler and more comprehensible, or if they show
the connections between their recommendations and the
goals of their users in better ways. Regarding their
affective appeal, just as in human social psychology
where people with similar character traits are attracted
to each other, it can be predicted that software will be
chosen by virtue of its expression of certain ‘personal-
ity’ traits that are similar to those of the user. Thus,
virtual assistants that respond to their users with a lan-
guage more in tune with their way of being and their
emotional states can be expected to stimulate more trust
in them [48, 49].
We believe that, if all these aspects are taken into
account, the reasoning that a human being could devel-
op with the help of a computer could influence her
judgment and behaviour more than any advice received
from other people. It should also be noted that in the
proposal that we have presented, judgments can be even
more persuasive than in other forms of AIenhancement
because the system is only an efficient assistant, a mid-
wife who helps users to give birth to a decision that is
completely theirs and from which they can feel more
proud precisely because of the fact that it is theirs.
Conclusions
Given our incomplete current knowledge of the biolog-
ical determinants of moral behaviour and of the use of
biotechnology to safely influence such determinants, it
is reckless to defend moral bioenhancement, even if it
were voluntary. However, the age-old human desire to
be morally better must be taken very seriously in a
globalised world where local decisions can have far-
reaching consequences and where moral corruption
14 We are aware that the issue of moral motivation is problematic and
that, for some rationalist approaches, reasons are motivating in them-
selves. An example of such a position is that of Harris, for whom the
only goal is to enhance human beings cognitively [42]. Recent discov-
eries in neuroscience, however, argue that non-rational, pre-conscious
factors also affect moral decision-making (see e.g. [43]). If this is the
case, Harris’s exclusive focus on Brationality and education^ would be
deficient. For this reason, many advocates of moral enhancement
believe that, for such enhancements to be successful, they should
address both our ability to reflect on what is right and our motivations.
See, for example, Douglas [4] and DeGrazia [5]. 15 Muir [45] and Klincewicz (p. 181) [46] maintain something similar.
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threatens the survival of us all. This situation forces us to
seek the satisfaction of that desire by means of other
technologies. AI could, in principle, be a good option.
Since it does not intervene directly in our biology, it can,
in principle, be less dangerous and controversial.
However, we argued that it also carries risks. For the
exhaustive project, these include the capitulation of
human decision-making to machines that we may not
understand and the negation of what makes us ethical
human beings. We argued also that even some auxiliary
projects that do not promote the surrendering of human
decision-making, for example systems that foster
decision-making on the basis of moral agents’ own
values, may jeopardise the development of our moral
capacities if they focus too much on outcomes, thus
providing insufficient opportunities for individuals to
be critical of their values and of the processes by which
outcomes are produced, which are essential factors for
personal moral progress and for rapprochement between
different individuals’ positions.
We proposed a new way in which AI could help us to
enhance our personal and group morality. It highlights
an interactive relationship between a human agent and a
computerised assistant. This assistant, in a Socratic way,
should ask questions and provide relevant information
to help the human agent to reach better moral judgments
and realisable behavioural options that cohere with
those judgments. This could be used both to exercise
the cognitive skills necessary for morality and to moti-
vate agents to behave according to what they think is
right. AI could thus represent an important advance in
the omnipresent problems in the history of ethics of how
to know what is right and how to motivate agents to act
accordingly. If people develop their arguments in dia-
logue with a machine that is more reliable than human
dialogists and more reliable than themselves, but that
leaves decision-making to human beings alone, resisting
the force of reason will be much more difficult.
Acknowledgements This article was written as a part of the
research project Artificial Intelligence and Biotechnology of Moral
Enhancement. Ethical Aspects (FFI2016-79000-P), funded by the
Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness of the Span-
ish Government. It was commenced whilst Francisco Lara was a
visiting researcher in the School of Medical Education, Newcastle
University, collaborating with Jan Deckers.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that they have no
conflict of interest.
Human and Animal Studies This article does not contain any
studies with human participants or animals performed by any of
the authors.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestrict-
ed use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if
changes were made.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional
affiliations.
References
1. Wallace, B., D. Cesarini, P. Lichtenstein, and M.
Johannesson. 2007. Heritability of ultimatum game re-
sponder behaviour. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences 104 (40).
2. Baron-Cohen, S. 2003. The essential difference: Men,
women and the extreme male brain. London: Penguin/
Basic Books.
3. Savulescu, J., & Maslen, H. 2015. Moral enhancement and
artificial intelligence: Moral AI?. In J. Romportl, E.
Zackova, & J. Kelemen (Eds.), Beyond artificial intelli-
gence. The disappearing human-machine divide (pp. 79–
95). Springer.
4. Douglas, T. 2008. Moral enhancement. Journal of Applied
Philosophy 25 (3): 228–245.
5. DeGrazia, D. 2014. Moral enhancement, freedom, and what
we (should) value in moral behaviour. Journal of Medical
Ethics 40 (6): 361–368.
6. Persson, I., and J. Savulescu. 2012. Unfit for the future.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Dietrich, E. 2001. Homo sapiens 2.0: Why we should build
the better robots of our nature. Journal of Experimental &
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 13 (4): 323–328.
8. Lara, F. 2017. Oxytocin, empathy and human enhancement.
Theoria 32 (3): 367–384.
9. Searle, J.R. 1994. The rediscovery of mind. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
10. Whitby, B. 2011. On computable morality. An examination
of machines as moral advisors. In Machine ethics, ed. M.
Anderson and S.L. Anderson, 138–150. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
11. Gips, J. 1995. Towards the ethical robot. In Android
Epistemology, ed. K.M. Ford, C. Glymour, and P. Hayes,
243–252. Cambridge: MIT Press.
12. Schaefer, G.O. 2015. Direct vs. indirect moral enhancement.
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (3): 261–289.
13. Focquaert, F., and M. Schermer. 2015. Moral enhancement:
Do means matter morally? Neuroethics 8 (2): 139–151.
F. Lara, J. Deckers286
14. Gauthier, D. 1986. Morals by agreement. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
15. Scanlon, T.M. 1998. What we owe to each other.
Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
16. Awad, E., S. Dsouza, R. Kim, J. Schulz, J. Henrich, A.
Shariff, J.F. Bonnefon, and I. Rahwan. 2018. The moral
machine experiment. Nature 563 (7729): 59–64.
17. Yampolskiy, R.V. 2013. Artificial intelligence safety engi-
neering: Why machine ethics is a wrong approach. In
Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence, SAPERE 5,
ed. V.C. Müller, 389–396. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
18. Kant, I. 1998. The critique of pure reason. Edited and
translated by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
19. Penrose, R. 1995. Shadows of the mind. A search for the
missing science of consciousness. London: Vintage.
20. Allen, C., G. Varner, and J. Zinser. 2000. Prolegomena to
Any Future Artificial Moral Agent. Journal of Experimental
& Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3): 251–261.
21. Miller, S. 2018. Autonomous weapons: terminator-esque
software design. In H. Prunckun (Ed.), Cyber Weaponry
(pp. 157–169). (Advanced Sciences and Technologies for
Security Applications). Cham: Springer.
22. Mill, J.S. 1859. On liberty, Edited by Edward Alexander.
Broadview Press, 1999.
23. Vallor, S. 2015. Moral deskilling and upskilling in a new
machine age: Reflections on the ambiguous future of char-
acter. Philosophy and Technology 28 (1): 107–124.
24. van Wynsberghe, A., and S. Robbins. 2018. Critiquing
the reasons for making artificial moral agents. Science
and Engineering Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007
/s11948-018-0030-8.
25. Giubilini, A., and J. Savulescu. 2017. The artificial moral
advisor. The `ideal observer´ meets artificial intelligence.
Philosophy and Technology 31: 1–20. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s13347-017-0285-z.
26. Firth, R. 1952. Ethical absolutism and the ideal ob-
server. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12
(3): 317–345.
27. Rawls, J. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
28. Seville, H., and D.G. Field. 2011.What can AI do for ethics?
In Machine ethics, ed. M. Anderson and S.L. Anderson,
499–511. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29. Anderson, M., Anderson, S.L. & Armen, C. 2005a. Towards
machine ethics: Implementing two action-based ethical the-
ories, proceedings of the AAAI fall symposium on machine
ethics, technical report FS-05-06. AAAI Press: 1–7.
30. Anderson, M., Anderson, S.L. & Armen, C. 2005b.
MedEthEx: Toward a medical ethics advisor, proceedings
of the AAAI fall symposium on caringmachines: AI in elder
care, technical report FS-05-02. AAAI Press: 9–16.
31. McLaren, B.M. 2006. Computational models of ethical rea-
soning: Challenges, initial steps, and future directions. IEEE
Intelligent Systems, July/August: 29–37.
32. Markkula Center for Applied Ethics. 2009. A Framework for
ethical decision making. https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-
resources/ethical-decision-making/a-framework-for-ethical-
decision-making/ . Accessed 26 January 2019.
33. Robbins, R.W., W.A.Wallace, and B. Puka. 2004. Supporting
ethical problems solving: An exploratory investigation
(proceedings of the 2004 SIGMIS conference on computer
personnel research: Careers, culture, and ethics in a
networked environment, 134–143). New York: ACM Press.
34. Robbins, R.W., and W.A. Wallace. 2007. Decision support
for ethical problem solving: A multi-agent approach.
Decision Support Systems 43 (4): 1571–1587.
35. Phillips-Wren, G., and N. Ichalkaranje, eds. 2008. Intelligent
decision making: An AI-based approach. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
36. Talbot, P.J., and D.R. Ellis. 2015. Applications of artificial
intelligence for decision-making. Multi-strategy reasoning
under uncertainty. In CreateSpace independent publishing
platform.
37. Tweedale, J.W., R. Neves-Silva, L.C. Jain, G. Phillips-Wren,
J. Watada, and R.J. Howlett, eds. 2016. Intelligent decision
technology support in practice. Springer.
38. Ruth, J. 2019. 6 Examples of AI in business intelligence
applications. https://www.techemergence.com/ai-in-
business-intelligence-applications/ . Accessed 26 January
2019.
39. Haynes, R.B., and N.L. Wilczynski. 2010. Effects of
computerised clinical decision support systems on practi-
tioner performance and patient outcomes : Methods of a
decision-maker-researcher partnership systematic review.
Implementation Science 5 (12): 1–8.
40. Eberhardt, J., A. Bilchik, andA. Stojadinovic. 2012. Clinical
decision support systems: Potential with pitfalls. Journal of
Surgical Oncology 105 (5): 502–510.
41. O’Sullivan, D., P. Fraccaro, E. Carson, and P. Weller. 2014.
Decision time for clinical decision support systems. Clinical
Medicine, Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of
London 14 (4): 338–341.
42. Harris, J. 2011. Moral enhancement and freedom. Bioethics
25 (2): 102–111.
43. Cunningham, W.A., M.K. Johnson, C.L. Raye, J.C.
Gatenby, J.C. Gore, and M.R. Banaji. 2004. Separable neu-
ral components in the processing of black and white faces.
Psychological Science 15 (12): 806–813.
44. Carlson, M.S., Desai, M., Drury, J.L., Kwak, H., & Yanco,
H.A. 2014. Identifying factors that influence trust in auto-
mated cars and medical diagnosis systems, AAAI sympo-
sium on the intersection of robust intelligence and trust in
autonomous systems, technical report SS-14-04. AAAI
Press: 20–27.
45. Muir, B.M. 1987. Trust between humans and machines, and
the design of decision aids. International Journal of Man-
Machine Studies 27 (5–6): 527–539.
46. Klincewizc, M. 2016. Artificial intelligence as a means to
moral enhancement. Studies in Logic, Grammar and
Rhetoric 48 (1): 171–187.
47. Lee, J.D., and K.A. See. 2004. Trust in automation:
Designing for appropriate reliance. Human Factors: The
Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 46
(1): 50–80.
48. Nass, C., and K.N. Lee. 2001. Does computer-synthesised
speech manifest personality? Experimental tests of recogni-
tion, similarity-attraction, and consistency-attraction. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Applied 7 (3): 171–181.
49. Picard, R.W. 1997. Affective computing. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Artificial Intelligence as a Socratic Assistant for Moral Enhancement 287
